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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MEDIC-CALL a corporation,
JENSEN, 1''1. D., PROFESSIONAL
EXCHANGE ANSWERING SER\'ICE and INDUSTRIAL COl\ll\'IUNlCATIONS COMPANY,
Petitionn·s.
vs.
PUBLIC SER\'lCE COl\1.lVIlSSION OF
UTAH, DONALD HACKING, HAL
S. B E N N E TT and JOHN T.
VERNIEU, COMMISSIONERS OF
THE PUBLIC SERYICE COJ1l\IISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

Case No.
11944

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Medic-CaU
The issue in thiis case is whether
Corporntion, is a public utility as defined by U. C. A. 542-1 (30), and therefore comes under the jurisdiction of the
Public Senrice Commission. The above Utah }aw requires
that a corporation must perform a service to the public
gen0rall:v in order to be classified as a public utility.

z
DISPOSITlON IN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The Public Service Commission, on December 10,
determined that Medic-Call Corporation, in connection witl
Harold Jensen, M. D., Professional Exchange Aniswering
Service, and Industrial Communications Company, wai
performing a public utility telephonic communicatioru
function, and that their activities come under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commi-'lsion of lTtah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the Public Service Commis·
sion of Utah correctly rnled that the vital communication
system operated by Medic-Call is a public utility and that
the ruling should be upheld.
ST A TE ME NT OF FACTS
Respondents have agreed to the stipulated facts i11
petitioner's brief, but contend that a reasonable interpreta·
tion of such facts clearly shows that Medic-Call Corpora·
tiion'<> communication system provides a service for the
public generally.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PETITIONERS QUALIFY AS A PUBLIC UTILITY SINCE THEIR SYSTEM EXISTS ONLY
BECAUSE OF THE NEED AND USE BY THE
GENERAL PUBLIC.

This c1se presents n novel que-qtion to the Utah Supreme CoLL·t. "[ k• decision of
or not the telecommunication system of l\Ieclic-Cnll Corporation is a public
utility \\°ill establish important p1·ecedent. The Court has
previously considcrecl whether certain electrical corporations or common carriers qualified as public utilities, but
the type of operation c:onclu<:ted by Medic-Call is the re-suit
of recent technological development and presents new problems re}(·anling- regulation, as will be discussed, infra.
While the issue is new, the policies upon which a solution will i·est are rnoteJ in the law. In an early landmark
case, Munn v. Wino is, 94 U. S. 113, 126 ( 1877), the U. S.
Supreme Court articulated the principles upon which state
public utiliL.v regulation rests. The Supreme Court held
that:
Property does become clothed with a public interest
when uised in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When,
t!herefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but so long as he maintains the
uise, he must submit to the control.
Respondents submit that the properly being used by MedicCall Corporation, i.e., transmitters, receivers, and other
rnrporate property is being used in a manner to make it
of puhlic consequence, that the system exists for emerg·enc:.'· use by the community, and that the system should
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be e:ontrnlled b.,. tlte Public Senice Commission for tn;
common good.
Petitioners argue that only physicians use the senitt
and that the public is only incidentally benefited;
fore, the operation of Medic-Call is not in the public inter
es.t. It is impo1tmt to note, howeve1-, that Part 89.507(el
of the Fedentl Communication Commission's Rules an;
Regulations dealing with the eligibility of physicians ti
hold radio licenses in the special emergency radio serviu
specifies that "Stations licensed to physicians or vetelinar·
i

ians may be used only for the transmission of message:
pertaining to the safety or life or prnperty and urgent
messages relating to the merlical duties of the licensee.'
The A. l\tI. A. in their attempt to get authorization for the
emergency facility stated that such a service would "...
foster the highest possible standard of medical service tn
the public.'' (Emphasis added.) Comments To The Cnm·

missions Rulrs. Section 89.507. Indeed, the application h
the F. C. C. by D1'. Harold .Jensen contained the following
commitment to the F. C. C. Special Emergency Application
12:110
March 10, 1969, Exhibit C.
1

The'Se messages will relate only to the medical
duties of each physician and messages which relall
to the safety of life and property of the
public. (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the American Medical Association's repre·
sentation ito the F. C. C., the regulations of Part 89 .507 (e).
and the physician's own verification as to the purpose of
the facilities, for petitioners to argue that the public is
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onl,r "incidenblly !Jenefited," and that the system exists
"onlr fo1· the use of the physicians" (Petitioner's Brief
'
pp.
is 11 1;t only inaccurate, but would violate the conditions under which the original license was granted by
the F. C. C. ln order to ohtain the emergency license, the
pllrsici<rns had to agTee that it was to be used b.\· the public
for \·ital message transmission.

1t seems clear that tht> purpose of Nledic-Call's com1;11mication system is not schizophrenic in nature; public

until the call re;1ches the switchboard of the answering
,;ervicc :rncl then
transformed into a priv,ate use
h,\· the maneuvering of the switchboard operator in transferring the call. The
was initiated for use by the
public in contacting physicians and remains in operation
only i)ecause the public needs such contact. The answering
.service cannot, <1.t their whim, decide whether or not to
contact a docto1· on the paging sy&tem when a call is received, but a1·e legally bound to complete the communication by C<mtract and by the policy underlying the existence
of tlw emergency facility. Nor is the paging service a toy
for the physician; he is bound by the licensing requirements of the F. C. C. to make certain that the facility is
used in the interest of the safety, property, and life of the
public. The doctor is not absolved from the responsibility
of answering merely because the call comes in on the
11ager; indeed the phy.sician knows that the reason for the
existence of the unit is for emergency communication relating to vital public interests. Both the physic,ians and
the answering service are bound by the F. C. C. regula-
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thl' facilii.v in tl1u pu rJ1·H.: Ill
· t e :·est. To
that they an• not leg-all,v bound \\'OLdd neg;tic the purpu.i

fur the granting of the license. The r.1emi.Jers of the gei
eJ";:l public: clcarl:: have a i·ight to use the facility.
The case Jll"2cede11t in Utah defining public utilitv ha•
dealt with thl' term in the context of electrical c01.'ptJJ'a
tions or cmn:11on caniel'S, and not in t!te context of
commL:nicatiom;. Even so, the1·e is no difficulty in apply
ing the•.se definitions of put:ic utility to the present cast
ln Crystal Car Linr· V. :·..,·tat<' Ta.r Comlllission, 110 ll!Ji
426, 174 P. 2d 9X-1, 9X7 (1946) the Court cited the 43 Am
J Ill'. definition from Section 2 p. ;)/ l, stating that
the term ''public utiilty" implies a public use alli.
service to the public; and indeed the principal d>
terminative characteristic of a public utility, is that
of service to, or readiness to service, an inriefinitf
public (or portion of the public as such) which h&·
a legal right to receive its services or commoditif'
It seems evident that the doctor's patients unquestionabl)

qualify as an indefinite po1·tion of the public, and thait they
have a legal right to the use of such emergency facilitie)
It is true, as stated in the Mnnn case, supra, that the ph)·
sicians may clio.scontinue the use of the service at any time
but it seems equally certain that as long as the use of tht
emergency
is maintained, that the public has a legal
right to the use of the-<se facilities.

In Garkanr PowP.1 r:o. v. Public Sai·icr Commission
9H Utah 166, 100 P. 2d i>71, 574 (1940), the Court said:
" 'the public' does not mean all of the people in tht
state or in any county or town. The public '1
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term used to designate individuals in general without restriction or selection."
In the event of a se1·ious heart attack, the1·e is no question
that any member or the victim's family, any friend, or even
a stranger would h<we every right to use the Medic-Call
for an emergency call. Thus there can be no restriction or selection of privileged individuals in the use of
this emergency communication system.

ln Garkane.

HU/ll'a,

f>7'!., the Comt said:

Garkane does not propose to hold itself out to serve
all who apply and live near its lines; its very character which gives it existence restricts its service
to a certain group (members). It does not propose
to serve "the Public generally," but only to serve
its members.
ln contrast to the Garkane operation, Medic-Call does propose to serve the public generally as stated in the physician's application to the F. C. C., supra. As has previously
been explained this eme1·genc)· system must be looked at
in its totality. If the system exists only for the physician,
whr does the doctor carry a one way pager? As the facts
mdicate, the doctor cannot get in touch with the patient by
using his pager; the system exists becauS€ the patient
wants to make contact with his physician. Only on rare
occasions would one doctor want to contact another doctor
by pager. The public is an indisputable part of the operation.
POINT II.
REGULATION OF MEDIC-CALL BY THE PUB-

8
LlC SER\'ICE COl\ll\IlSSION JS ESSENTIAL
TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST.
Petitioners ai·gue that " . . . the public or member.'
thereof as such pay nothing for the service.'' ( Petitionen
B1·iei', p. 7.) But the public does pay for the service. The11

is no doubt that the public, thrnugh the administratiVf
agency of the F. C. C., has given valuable consideration(,
tlw Medic-Call Corporation by gTanting it a license. Then
is no question, either, that the fees paid to the doctors b)
the patients are used to pay for the service, or that th1
physicians can claim a tax benefit from the cost of operat
ing the service. However, payment alone for a service doe1
not determine whether or not it should be regulated. Fm
example, a sender or receiver of a telegram is entitled !r.1
service, regardless of whether the telgram is sent collect or
prepaid. In Nebbia v. People of the State of Ne10 York,
291 U. S. 502, 508 (1934) the Supreme Court held that
" ... there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion ana
by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business
in any of its aspects . . . . " When the public sends urgent
messages relating to the life, safety, and property into the
emergency communication system of Medic-Call, such a
facility handles the message as a trustee for the public ana
State regulation is necessary to ensure that this trustee
relationship is properly and adequaitely maintained.
What we have here is an organization capable of transmitting urgent messages relating to public safety, prop·
erty, and life along the Wasatch front from Ogden ti
Provo, and with the potential of serving tens of thousandi
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of patient'> and hundreds of physicians. Even though lJl"esent facilities contemplate service for only one hundred
ph>•sicians and their patients, this portion of the public
\\"Ould need to have the system regulated for the common
good and general welfare. But under the licenose granted
by the F. C. C., this service can be expanded by the desire
of the physicians to include all doctors in the area needing
communication with the public. In fact, Exhibit C of the
physician's application, supra, anticipates such expansion
as rapidly as the need arises.
It seems certain, then, that the Medic-Call facility is
held in trust by the Corporation for the public use and
that State regulation is essential to ensure that the services
are prnperly and adequately supervised. Should the physi-

cians wish to discontinue the service they may do so, but
so long as the facility has granted to the public an interest
in the use, it must submit to State control.
CONCLUSION
Because of the trustee nature of the Medic-Call operation, its commitment to rthe F. C. C. that it would serve the
general public in accordance with Part 89.507 of rthe Commission's Rules and the Utah cases defining public utili'
ties, it is evident that the Corporation does perform a service to the public generally. It is equally clear thart such
an emergency system must be regulated by the State to
ensure that the public interest and trust are not violated.
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Respondents therefore submit that Medic-Call Corporan
is a public utility unde1· U. C. A. 54-2-1 (80), and that
rnling of the Public Service Commi,-ssion should be a!.
fil"mecl.
submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
VERL R. TOPHAM
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondenli

